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On November, 11, 2011, the International Crimes Division (ICD) of the High Court of Uganda convened at the High Court in Gulu to follow recommendations set forth by the Constitutional Court pertaining to the trial of ex-LRA commander Col. Thomas Kwoyelo. These photos capture what transpired. For more information, visit www.justiceandreconciliation.com.
Copyright © 2011 Justice and Reconciliation Project
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On November, 11, 2011, the International Crimes Division (ICD) of the High Court of Uganda convened at the High Court in Gulu to follow recommendations set forth by the Constitutional Court pertaining to the trial of ex-LRA commander Col. Thomas Kwoyelo. After the ICD ordered the cessation of the trial and referred Kwoyelo’s release to the DPP and the Amnesty Commission, JRP’s Lino Owor Ogora answered questions by media outside the court building.
Copyright © 2011 Justice and Reconciliation Project
“US Troop Deployment Revisited – The Hunt for Kony,” Justice in Conflict blog, 3 Nov. 2011
http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/11/03/us-troop-deployment-revisited-%E2%80%93-the-hunt-for-kony/
By Patrick Wegner
US President Barack Obama’s decision to send 100 combat armed military advisors to Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Southern Sudan made worldwide headlines about three weeks ago. The controversial decision and discussions about its consequences brought the LRA conflict back into the headlines after the world had all but forgotten about the steady trickle of mutilations, killings and abductions mainly committed in the DRC and CAR by the LRA. One thing has become very clear to me in interviews with diplomats and staff of international organizations that are working in the context of the conflict: the LRA is no longer seen as a threat for regional stability. This means that the LRA conflict has ceased to matter in the big picture of geopolitics. It is another one of those low intensity conflicts that claim the lives of innocent civilians on a daily basis but are not endangering the security interests of powerful nations. What does the US troop deployment mean in this context?
Since foreign policy practitioners do not see the conflict as a risk to regional stability, President Obama’s move could be regarded as a surprise. Yet, it makes perfect sense both in a US domestic as well as in an international perspective. The US has seen constant campaigning by civil society organizations like Enough and Invisible Children who pressure the US administration to do something about the deaths of innocent civilians in Central Africa. The campaigning led to the signing of the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act by Barack Obama in May 2010. A high ranking diplomat I talked to a couple of weeks before the troop deployment told me that he expects the US to ‘do something’ in the LRA context soon, as a Congress report on the LRA Act was upcoming in late October and the administration needed to be seen doing something. His prediction proved right.
From the international perspective, Uganda is of high strategic importance in the region. The Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) is one of the strongest armies in the area. It plays a major role in the UN Mission in Somalia, provides staff for UNAMID in Darfur, and plays the leading role in regional efforts to hunt down the LRA. The fact that the UPDF is providing troops for these missions removes pressure from Western nations to deploy their own troops in the region. Finally, the recent discovery of oil has just increased Uganda’s importance. The decision can therefore also be seen as an acknowledgement of the important role Uganda is playing in the region.Many Ugandans I talked to are deeply distrustful of the US intervention. Most people think that the US is showing up now, years after the war ended in northern Uganda, because oil has been discovered in Amuru. Yet, the LRA is no longer a Ugandan issue. The LRA has spread over three states in the region, and people are still dying. So there are valid arguments for intervening on humanitarian grounds. But what is the impact of the deployment we can expect on the ground? Critics like Lindsay McCain of the Justice and Reconciliation Project from northern Uganda say that the deployment of US military advisors will reinforce the military logic of the conflict and lead to the death of innocent abducted children that travel with the LRA. She criticises the lack of a humanitarian component and a focus on protecting civilians in the affected regions from LRA attacks. I think those arguments are valid and point out a significant weakness of the US approach to combating the LRA. Yet, the deployment of US advisors might still help to stop the conflict and end the suffering of civilians in the longer term.
The US has been supporting the UPDF for several years. In the beginning, this support was mainly given through financial aid for the military budget. During Operation Lightning Thunder, that marked the end of negotiation efforts during the Juba Peace Process and was meant to ‘wipe out’ the LRA, US military advisors provided the UPDF with information and advice. Still the operation failed. Afterwards, the US supported the hunt for Kony and the remaining LRA rebels through providing the UPDF with GPS data and satellite imagery. Yet, the UPDF was not sufficiently equipped to act on that information. On the one hand, they had no means to use the exact GPS data the US provided them with, on the other hand the UPDF rapid response capacities were insufficient to hunt down the LRA fast enough.
The deployment of US military advisors on the ground who can help the UPDF to make use of the data forwarded by US military intelligence could make a real difference. The UPDF has been close to capturing or killing Kony at least twice in recent years. In August 2009, the UPDF ran into Joseph Kony’s bodyguards in CAR and killed several of them in the ensuing gunfight, yet Kony managed to escape while being chased by the UPDF.
In October 2011 the UPDF again ran into Kony’s entourage according to the UPDF spokesman. Kony moves inside several circles of security perimeters. Three rings of bodyguards move constantly with him, and as soon as the outer ring engages in combat, Kony has the opportunity to quickly flee into the opposite direction. But chances are that Kony will eventually run out of luck if the UPDF is able to track his group more closely with the help of US military advisors.
We might well see the end of Joseph Kony’s flight soon. Whether this would mean the end of the conflict is not clear though. The LRA has splintered into ever smaller groups and it is not clear in how far Kony still has full control of them. Independent LRA groups may be roaming through CAR and DRC abducting and killing civilians for years after Kony’s death or capture. Additionally, UN sources have told me that many armed groups and militias in the DRC have started mimicking LRA attacks to cover up their robberies. It is hard to say how much of the ‘LRA activity’ we see in the region is actually local banditry.
Finally, on an interesting side note, a former top LRA Commander I was able to talk to told me that Joseph Kony had announced as early as 1998 that his spirits had revealed to him that Ugandans would bring in the US to hunt him. Kony made a prophecy that the war would end when the US becomes involved. They would not be able to catch him, but would help the Acholi of northern Uganda to recover from the war. Kony said that his spirits revealed to him that he would just disappear in the jungle, ‘like Moses disappeared after leading his people to the Holy Land’. The spirits told him that the US would come to search for him, only to eventually find out that he had disappeared without a trace for ever.
“Targets or Captives? Obama’s LRA Challenge,” CIC, 19 Oct. 2011
http://www.opencanada.org/features/targets-or-captives-obama%e2%80%99s-lra-challenge/#.Tpydk0dlwRk.facebook
By Erin Baines
Last week in Gulu, northern Uganda, in what might seem like a rather ordinary event, something remarkable happened: Grace gave birth, surrounded by her female friends. After more than thirty hours of hard labour and an emergency caesarean section, Grace’s tiny baby girl was placed into her arms. The bringing of new life into this world is always special, but this time it represented a moment in which a group of friends that had suffered through decades of war, each having lost family members, opportunities to study and their own childhood, could hope again.
The women were all once abductees of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). They have all lived, grown up, and borne children inside the confines of the rebel group’s camps. Grace herself was abducted by the rebels at the age of 14 and forced to marry a rebel commander. The birth of her daughter amongst so much love is the promise of new life.
The women now work in a small project in northern Uganda, the Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP), to help victims of the war tell their story, to heal and to seek social change. I have worked with this group since they began in 2005 and watched them come together as a family that loves and cares for each other, helping each other rebuild their own lives as well as that of others who lost. They are a stark reminder that, while the rebel leader Joseph Kony remains free and continues to commit atrocities, he is surrounded by literally hundreds of people who were forced into, and now find home in his confines.
Today U.S. President Barack Obama announced he is deploying 100 “combat-equipped” troops to Uganda to help efforts to arrest or eradicate rebels of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) – rebels responsible for the suffering of millions of people in Uganda and neighbouring countries. The U.S. troops will work with the Ugandan military to root out the rebels and put an end to their more than two decades of terror. The LRA is one of the cruellest, most brutal rebel groups known, abducting tens of thousands of children like Grace and forcing them to fight in a war, or to be wives to commanders. In addition to abduction, the rebel signature is the murder, mutilation, rape and plunder of civilians.
Originally operational in Uganda and later Sudan, the LRA’s numbers and strength have dwindled in recent years. In 2003 a Ugandan-led military operation against LRA bases in Sudan led to the escape or release of many captives, including Grace, and the capture of commanders. But the leadership, including enigmatic spirit leader Joseph Kony and military war criminals like Okot Odhiambo remain at large, and continue to abduct, kill and maim civilians in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and in South Sudan, where they operate across borders in small mobile groups. Indicted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2005, these are men everyone wants to see stopped and held accountable.
Obama’s decision to send troops seems like a positive step. The countries affected support the military action to end human suffering and welcome the troops to defeat a small rebel group that has caused so much damage. Certainly the young activists who have long demanded Obama, and before him George W. Bush, to do something – anything – to end the atrocities of the LRA are cheering. Human rights activists in the U.S. and around the globe have done everything in their power to direct attention to the suffering of abducted children and communities affected by the LRA. Groups like Resolve, Invisible Children and Enough have tried a range of advocacy tactics from holding house parties to raise awareness of American youth, abducting themselves until local politicians or notables agreed to help, talking to Oprah and more conventional tactics like mobilizing massive numbers of students to lobby their state representatives to push a bill on the LRA through Congress.
One of the most impressive strategies to date has been the creation of the LRA tracker, which creates a visual database of all LRA atrocities – each attack, abduction or murder – they currently commit as they move through north eastern Congo today, made possible by working with local organizations working on the ground to solidify communication and protection networks. Surely Obama, whom leaders of these young activists have met, was inspired by their own courage to do something too.
Grace and others who were abducted and escaped during the campaign against the rebels in Sudan, however, worry. Over the years I have worked with JRP in northern Uganda, I have witnessed the team learn when someone had escaped and arrived at the reception centre, only to rush there to console the person now safe and to assure that life can begin anew. Once those who reach safety are healthy – for many return with varying states of malnutrition, disease and wounds of war – Grace and the team work to help them reunite with their families, to find housing and employment, and to soothe them through periods of mourning for those they lost. They tell stories of the days with the rebels, the difficulties of life on the battlefield being chased by the Ugandan army. Some women gave birth without any medical attention under a tree as bullets were exchanged. Others described the moment they realized their child had been hit by a bullet, how there was no time to do anything but lie the child down and continue to flee. Grace knows these painful stories more than anyone else; her five-year-old son, born of forced marriage, was killed when a military bomb was dropped on him in 2004.
So while the military action is a triumph of years of activists and victims calling for the world to intervene and to stop this campaign of violence, I am reminded by the birth of that baby girl that LRA commanders surround themselves with those they have abducted, with innocent women, men and children, who have nothing to do with this war but who suffer as their captives.
The LRA has always been unique in this manner. For years they moved with mothers and children as they fought, refusing to release them. The commanders surround themselves with child soldiers (girls and boys who form the front line). But the LRA is also unique in that some of the commanders themselves are victims. For instance, one of the most wanted commanders, ICC indicted Dominic Ongwen, was captured around 1990 when he was about ten years old. At some undefined point, the international community decided that Ongwen no longer deserved the right to be rescued by the international community, but to be hunted down and held accountable for this war.
The abduction of children and birth of children into the LRA complicates questions of justice and humanitarian intervention in what, at first blush, seems like an easy victory for Obama’s foreign policy team. But as those hundred U.S. soldiers arrive to shore up the Ugandan military’s effort, will they know how to differentiate a rebel from a child who is captive? Will bombs land only on the commanders responsible, sparing the lives of the children? I would feel much more relief if I was reassured that their tracking technologies are equipped to help those being held against their will – some who have been there for decades, others only months – to find their way home. The chance for new life for babies born into love after so much suffering and death depends on the wisdom of Obama and others who join them to end this war, to know the difference. In addition to a military operation to capture Joseph Kony, this must also be a humanitarian mission to free those whose lives he has tried to destroy.
Erin Baines is co-founder of the Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP) in Gulu, Uganda.
Photo by Lara Rosenoff-Gauvin: Beatrice in Padibe IDP Camp, Kitgum District, Northern Uganda 2007. Beatrice was abducted by the LRA when she was 12 and served 2 years before escaping. 1 in 5 girls and 1 in 3 boys have been abducted at some point by the LRA to serve as ‘child soldiers’ in Northern Uganda. www.hernameisbeatrice.com
“Analysis: Should child soldiers be prosecuted for their crimes?,” IRIN News, 6 Oct. 2011
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=93900
JOHANNESBURG, 6 October 2011 (IRIN) – International human rights law meanders between the vague and the hazy when it comes to its stance on the age of criminal responsibility and what, if any, punishments should be imposed on child soldiers guilty of war crimes.
The godfather of human rights laws, the Geneva Conventions, oblige all member states to act on grave breaches of human rights, but does not stipulate the age of criminal responsibility.
Robert Young, deputy permanent observer and legal adviser to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) based in New York, told IRIN international humanitarian law (IHL) remains “silent” on the age of responsibility for perpetrators of grave human rights abuses, such as wilful killing, torture and inhumane treatment.
International Criminal Court (ICC) Article 26 prevents the court from prosecuting anyone under the age of 18, but not because it believes children should be exempt from prosecution for international crimes, “but rather that the decision on whether to prosecute should be left to States,” says the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for children and armed conflict (Working Paper Number 3: Children and Justice During and in the Aftermath of Armed Conflict, September 2011). “[The] exclusion of children from the ICC jurisdiction avoided an argument between States on the minimum age for international crimes,” it noted.
The age of criminal responsibility varies from country to country, from 7-16, but the bar is most commonly set at 14.
Although IHL does not set a minimum age for criminal responsibility for international crimes, it is argued that a yardstick has been laid down for some form of indemnity through IHL’s recognition that recruitment of child soldiers under 15 was a war crime.
The Children and Justice During and in the Aftermath of Armed Conflict report says: “If a child under the age of 15 is considered too young to fight, then he or she must also be considered too young to be held criminally responsible for serious violations of IHL while associated with armed forces or armed groups.”
“Children are often desired as recruits because they can be easily intimidated and indoctrinated. They lack the mental maturity and judgment to express consent or to fully understand the implications of their actions… and are pushed by their adult commanders into perpetrating atrocities,” the report said.
That children should be held accountable for their crimes during conflicts was acknowledged by the report, but “more effective and appropriate methods, other than detention and prosecution are encouraged, enabling children to come to terms with their past and the acts they committed.”
The report said child soldiers should not be prosecuted “simply for association with an armed group or for having participated in hostilities… There are instances where children are accused of crimes under national or international law and are prosecuted before a criminal court. Prosecution of a child should always be regarded as a measure of last resort and the purpose of any sentence should be to rehabilitate and reintegrate the child into society.”
Victims and perpetrators
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) did not cite a minimum age for criminal responsibility, but no one under 18 appeared before the tribunals. The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) provided the court with jurisdiction over any person above 15, but the court’s prosecutor decided against indicting children for war crimes because of their dual status as both victims and perpetrators.
It may appear a grey area easily resolved by providing indemnity for crimes committed by child soldiers under the age of 15, but Radhika Coomaraswamy, SRSG for children and armed conflict, noted – in a 2010 article for the International Journal of Children’s Rights:The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict – Towards Universal Ratification – that such a provision could be perversely used.
“If minor children who have committed serious war crimes are not prosecuted, this could be an incentive for their commanders to delegate to them the dirtiest orders, aiming at impunity. For this reason the ICC and SCSL focus strongly on those persons most responsible for human rights and IHL violations and apply the concept of command responsibility to political and military leaders,” Coomaraswamy said.
Command responsibility does not necessarily remove individual culpability for serious human rights violations by lower ranks or subordinates, but “rather it traces liability back up the chain of command,” said legal adviser to the ICRC Young.
When child soldiers become adults
Dominic Ongwen was about 10 when he became a soldier with the Lord’s Resistance Army in the 1980s.
The ICC issued an arrest warrant for him in October 2005 for crimes against humanity, including enslavement of children. However, jurisdiction by the court does not extend to crimes committed by people under 18, and before 2002 when the Rome Statute entered into force. The crimes cited are for when Ongwen was an adult.
“Ongwen is the first known person to be charged with the same war crimes of which he is also a victim,” the Justice and Reconciliation Project, a Ugandan NGO concerned with transitional justice, said in a 2008 field note entitled Complicating Victims and Perpetrators in Uganda: On Dominic Ongwen.
“[Ongwen and other child soldiers] represent precisely the kind of complex political victims who, if excluded from justice pursuits, could give birth to the next generation of perpetrators in Uganda; generations marginalized by the judicial sector and who have nothing to gain from citizenship and nothing to lose from war,” the field note observed.
The Lubanga case
Tomaso Falchetta, Child Soldiers International (CSI) legal and policy adviser, told IRIN child soldiers should be viewed as victims and the NGO opposed their prosecution, as emphasis should be on the criminal responsibility of the adult recruiters. CSI “does not advocate for a cut-off point [for the prosecution of child soldiers], as it is a difficult issue.”
The first person to stand trial at the ICC for enlisting children under 15 was former Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) warlord Thomas Lubanga. His trial at The Hague is nearing completion after he allegedly recruited underage children into the Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (FPLC) during the conflict in Ituri, a district in the eastern DRC, between 2002 and 2003.
An international humanitarian law expert, who declined to be identified, told IRIN Lubanga’s case was “tremendously important” as “it will make others pause and think… Every rebel leader must be aware of this case.”
Falchetta said it was “difficult to provide an empirical judgement on that [Lubanga’s ICC prosecution being a deterrent]”, and rather that accountability needed to be enforced at the national state level to discourage the continued use of child soldiers.
The former DRC president, Laurent Kabila, said in 2000 the armed forces would demobilize all child soldiers but a year after he made the commitment, four DRC child soldiers aged 14-16 were granted clemency, after death sentences imposed by a military tribunal led to international condemnation from human rights organizations. A 14-year-old child soldier was reportedly executed the previous year.
Capital punishment for persons under 18 violates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The DRC is party to both international human rights treaties.
“The DRC laws may be there [the use of child soldiers is illegal], but when it comes to implementation, investigation and prosecution [of adult recruiters], we’ve seen little of that,” Falcetta said.
The CSI said in an April 2011 report (entitled Report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child in Advance of the DRC initial report on the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict) that “hundreds of children remain in the ranks of the national armed forces (Forces Armées de la Republique Démocratique du Congo) despite legal and policy obligations to release them and government pledges to do so.”
Laws of war
Matthew Happold of Hull University in the UK said in 2005 paper entitled The Age of Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law there were “good reasons” for regulating criminal responsibility of international crimes through international law as they were “often distinguished from crimes under national law because they transcend national boundaries and are of concern to the international community.”
He said, in the paper presented at the Hague Academic Coalition’s conference on international criminal responsibility, that from the perspective of a defendant, “it would seem wrong for an individual’s liability under international law to depend upon the place of prosecution…. States are obliged to prosecute and punish offenders. Permitting States to decide their own age of criminal responsibility would allow them to determine the scope of their international obligations.”
Child soldiers, like any other combatants are subjected to the Nuremburg principle that holds: “The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.”
ICC’s Article 33 determines that acting on orders from superiors was not a defence of criminal responsibility but there are mitigating circumstances, and among them, is that a person may be relieved from prosecution if they did not know the order was unlawful.
However, the commission of “manifestly unlawful” crimes, such as genocide or crimes against humanity cannot be mitigated.
Young said the “so-called `defence of superior orders’… the [Nuremberg] principle that `I was just following orders’ can no longer relieve any of us of criminal (and moral) responsibility for unconscionable acts we commit at the behest of others.”
However, Rule 155 of Customary IHL, provided leeway, where “coercion and duress may provide exceptions… and one can quickly imagine how this principle might mitigate the responsibility of a child soldier who was forcibly recruited and forced, under threat of harm, to commit war crimes,” ICRC adviser Young said.
“Absence Of Compensation Law Worries LRA War Victims,” Uganda Radio Network, 10 Aug. 2011
http://ugandaradionetwork.com/a/story.php?s=35992
By Joe Wacha
Absence of a law regulating compensation of war victims is causing worry among the people, who suffered losses during the two-decade insurgency in northern Uganda.
Absence of a law regulating compensation of war victims is causing worry among the people, who suffered losses during the two-decade insurgency in northern Uganda.
Several people who lost family members, suffered harm or lost property during the war between Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army rebels and government, have been demanding for compensation but such a move requires a legal basis for its successful realization.
During the Juba peace agreement, both government and the LRA rebels resolved that government should establish necessary arrangements for making reparations to victims of the conflict. The implementation protocol of the agreement signed on May 27th 2007 provides that government shall include a special fund for victims out of which, reparations shall be paid.
However, over four years later, no such arrangement has been initiated leaving some of the war victims to question the willingness of government to address their plight.
Already, a number of rights groups and civil society organizations have voiced their concerns over the absence of a policy providing for compensation of the war victims.
Catherine Lakareber, a twenty seven year old mother who was maimed during the war, says that for years they have continued to wait on government to pronounce itself on the issue of reparation.
Richard Todwong, the MP for Nwoya County in Nwoya district was previously assigned to compile the list of the war victims, when he was still a presidential adviser in charge of northern Uganda. Todwong says he registered over 6,000 war victims. He however notes that no attempt has been made to enact a law providing for the compensation of the victims.
As a result, Todwong says he is now preparing to move a Private Members Bill on Compensation of war victims.
Democratic Party president, Norbert Mao has underscored the need for such a law. He explains that the presence of a law governing compensation of war victims would make it a national government program and not for political patronage as is being practiced.
//Cue in: “Compensation to war victims…”
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Lino Ogora, a transitional justice expert in Gulu says that present attempts to provide compensation are biased. He cites the compensation of the Mukura victims that he said had no clear criteria and was conducted through an individual. In 2010, government paid 200 million shillings to the survivors and relatives of the 1989 Mukura massacre. On 11th July 1989 soldiers of the National Resistance Army suffocated to death 55 suspected rebels in a train wagon at Mukura in Ngora District.
On April 20th 1995, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) entered the trading centre of Atiak and after an intense offensive, defeated the Ugandan army stationed there. Hundreds of men, women, students and young children were then rounded up by the LRA and marched a short distance into the bush until they reached a river. There, they were separated into two groups according to their sex and age. After being lectured for their alleged collaboration with the Government, the LRA commander in charge ordered his soldiers to open fire three times on a group of about 300 civilian men and boys as women and young children witnessed the horror. The LRA commander reportedly in charge – the now indicted second in command Vincent Otti – then turned to the women and children and told them to applaud the LRA’s work. Before leaving, youth were selectively rounded up and forced to join the LRA to serve as the next generation of combatants and sexual slaves.
Twelve years later, the wounds of the massacre have far from healed. As the survivor’s testimony at the beginning of this report puts it, “all of us live as if our bodies do not have souls.” Despite the massacre being one of the largest and by reputation most notorious in the twenty-one year history of the conflict, no official record, investigation or acknowledgement of events exists. No excavation of the mass grave has been conducted and therefore the exact number of persons killed is not known. Survivors literally live with the remains of bullet fragments inside them. Although the massacre site is only a few kilometres from the trading centre, a proper burial of those slaughtered 12 years ago is not complete: as one survivor reminds us, “the bodies of some people were never brought back home, because there were no relatives to carry them home.”
This report seeks to provide the first known written record of events leading to the massacre based on the testimony of 41 survivors and witnesses, as well as prominent community members. It does not claim to be complete, but rather provides a partial record in hopes of prompting the Government to begin an investigation into the multiple massacres that have taken place in Uganda. Ideally, this will lead the Government to advance a transitional justice strategy, together with civil society, that will begin to heal the open wounds of Atiak. To this end, recommendations are advanced in the final sections of this report.
To access the report, click here