Tag Archives: amnesty

International Criminal Court Presents Community Screenings of the Ongwen Trial

The trial of former LRA Commander Dominic Ongwen resumed on Tuesday, September 18, at the International Criminal Court in The Hague, with an opening statement from the defense. Miles and miles away, Ugandans gathered around televisions and hunched over radios, following each detail of the proceedings. Many attended screening events organized by the ICC itself. The court endeavored to make the trial accessible to those people whose lives were torn apart by conflict. The Justice and Reconciliation Project hosted one such screening in the organization offices at Koro-Pida.

Some one hundred participants arrived by bus from various locations. They crammed together on white, plastic chairs. Mothers brought small children, who sat in their laps or played on the floor. The screening was near silent. Attendees only spoke during the breaks, when they shared snacks and soda, or relaxed in a courtyard.

The ICC strove to create an open space, where the community could truly engage with the trial, however distant. Eric MP Odong, a field assistant, said, “We are here to execute the mandate of the registry of the court, and to serve the victim community.”

The screening at JRP was not the first of its kind nor was it the only event in the area. Another screening, this one at Gulu District Hall, was so packed that people spilled on to the ground outside. Engagement in the case is high. “We are responding to the interest and the demand of communities, who want to follow the trial,” said Jimmy Otim, another field assistant. In fact, the ICC has organized screening events since Ongwen’s trial began two years ago. Court representatives travel to areas with little electricity and bad roads in order to disseminate information.

Many of these locations were the sight of LRA attacks. Emotions run high and memories of war are fresh. “My better half of my life is the conflict,” said Otim. “That is why I studied conflict, to understand why people suffer.” His work is personal. Otim also vividly remembers trial screenings at which community members corroborated the information on screen, pointing to places where violence occurred. As a result, counselors and facilitators are always present.

community members watch the Dominic Ongwen defnese at the JRP offices in Koro-Pida. Photo credit, Sophia Neiman
Community members watch the Dominic Ongwen defnese at the JRP offices in Koro-Pida. Photo credit, Sophia Neiman.

Responses to these screenings have been overwhelmingly positive. According to Otim, “[The community] is happy that what happened to them is being heard in an independent court, they are happy that what happened to them is being recognized. They are happy that maybe, ultimately, they’ll get justice.”

Odong agrees. “I see justice being done,” he said. “The prosecution did its part and now it is the defense’s turn. I see justice by allowing different parties to express themselves.” Odong claims he will be satisfied regardless of the outcome. “The process of the trial will have cleansed the accused, even if he is set free,” he said.

The trial culminates a longer hunt for Ongwen and his fellow rebels. More than eleven years ago, the ICC issued a warrant for his arrest, along with warrants for Vincent Otti and enigmatic leader Joseph Kony.  In 2014, Ongwen was captured along the border between South Sudan and the Central African Republic, and turned over to the court. His is a painful saga, and one that contains the complex history of the conflict itself.

Ongwen was abducted by the LRA when he was nine years old. He was walking to primary school near Gulu. Like many other young boys, he was forced to watch and later commit heinous acts, and was brutally inducted into the army. Unlike many, however, Ongwen ascended the ranks. He reached the LRA control alter and came to command the notorious Sinia Brigade. This wing of the LRA attacked internally displaced person’s camps, specifically Abok, Odek, Lukodi and Pajule. Ongwen himself is charged with 70 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including abducting children to use as soldiers and sex slaves.

Thus, Ongwen can be cast as both victim and perpetrator; a man whose life was altered by the conflict, and a man who altered the lives of others. He is also the first and lowest ranking member of the LRA to be tried internationally. Kony is still at large. Otti is presumed dead.

Seeing such a man stand trial can be divisive and upsetting. Some want him in jail, punished for years of havoc, while others believe he was boy brainwashed, and so deserves amnesty. Many community members are former abductees themselves, and do not understand why they have been forgiven and Ongwen has not.

Andrew Simbo has worked in transitional justice in both Uganda and Sierra Leone. He is currently the executive director of Uganda Women’s Action Program. The organization helps to bring more women and children to the ICC screenings. He claims that communities have now become fully reintegrated, “Those who actually carried out the atrocities are in the communities now. They have been given amnesty. They are the boda boda riders; some are musicians. They are there. They have been integrated into the community,” He added, passionately, “people have moved on.” While UWAP remains a neutral body, Simbo asserts it can be difficult to explain the mere fact of Ongwen’s charges to community members.

Justin Ocan, a community representative from Lukodi, believes that the screenings themselves will lead to a better future. “We tell these populations that this is also a learning environment, because we need to learn this time, so that you transfer the knowledge you gained from this screening to your children, so that in the future they don’t engage themselves in such kinds of practices,” he said.

Regardless of what the court decides, or even of divided opinions, one thing is certain. Sharing information, and making that information accessible, is crucial. It brings people together. It binds them in knowledge and informed conversation. It cements community. Justice itself is a long and twisting process, and its outcomes can never be universally satisfying. Yet, Ocan puts it beautifully, if simply: “Justice is a collective effort to attain a peaceful life.”

As the trial continues, people of many different opinions, can come together and watch it unfold.

Grassroots Perspectives on Amnesty

Report on Community Dialogues Conducted in Koch Goma Sub-County (Acholi Sub-Region), Abia Sub-County (Lango Sub-Region), Obalanga Sub-County (Teso Sub-Region) and Romogi Sub-County (West Nile Sub-Region) to Gather Grassroots Perspectives on Amnesty in Uganda

From the 7 – 29 October 2014, the Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP) on behalf of the Uganda Law Society (ULS) conducted four community dialogues in the sub-regions of Acholi, Lango, Teso and West Nile in northern Uganda to solicit grassroots perspectives on Uganda’s Amnesty Act of 2000. The dialogues were conducted as part of a wider research project being implemented by the Uganda Law Society to inform the drafting of a future Model Amnesty Law for Uganda. This report provides a summary of the views and perspectives gathered from these dialogues. Detailed transcriptions of the dialogues are also attached as annexes.

Download this report here (pdf).

“The End of Amnesty: Whither “Peace Versus Justice” in Northern Uganda?” Justice in Conflict blog, 12 June 2012

“The End of Amnesty: Whither “Peace Versus Justice” in Northern Uganda?” Justice in Conflict blog, 12 June 2012
http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/06/12/the-end-of-amnesty-whither-peace-versus-justice-in-northern-uganda/

By Mark Kersten

I couldn’t resist contributing to the discussion that Mark Schenkel has begun with his fantastic post on the expiration of northern Uganda’s Amnesty Act. Readers shouldn’t let the fact that the story hasn’t been widely covered fool them into believing it isn’t of tremendous importance or that its implications aren’t significant. As Mark has shown, it is and they are.

I wanted to highlight just how remarkable it is that not only has the expiration of Part 2 of the Amnesty Act come as a surprise to many observers, but it has subsequently been met with barely a murmur – almost as if it wasn’t all that important. This is noteworthy in its own right. When the ICC intervened in northern Uganda in 2004 and subsequently issued arrest warrants for LRA leader Joseph Kony and four other senior rebel commanders, the “peace versus justice” floodgates opened. The debate was pervasive and polarizing. Much of it revolved around the over-simplified but potent question of whether rebels should be forgiven via amnesty or punished via the ICC. A legion of local and international voices declared that peace could only be achieved if LRA rebels could be guaranteed that they would not be prosecuted if they left the bush. This view was premised on fears that the threat of prosecuting rebels would leave them with no option but to continue fighting. They consequently called on the ICC to back off and give peace through forgiveness a chance. Of course, the ICC warrants stayed in place. However, thousands of LRA combatants received amnesty certificates following their defection from the rebel ranks.

Just years later, the “peace versus justice” debate has virtually disappeared. Take, for example, the prosecution of Thomas Kwoyelo, the former senior LRA commander who was detained by the Ugandan forces (UPDF) in 2009. True, the controversy around Kwoyelo’s prosecution  has concerned whether he should be issued an amnesty. But the debate has almost exclusively been a legal debate, centering around whether or not he is eligible to receive an amnesty under Ugandan law (answer: absolutely) and whether receiving an amnesty is in contravention of Uganda’s international obligations (answer: I don’t think so). What the debate hasn’t been about is whether granting Kwoyelo amnesty would risk undermining the progress northern Uganda has made towards order and stability.

Consider too the example of Caesar Achellam, the LRA rebel commander who was recently “captured” by Ugandan military forces. Again, there exists no palpable concern that arresting Achellam and possibly putting him on trial jeopardizes peace in northern Uganda. Interestingly, the Achellam story has received significantly more international coverage than the Kwoyelo trial. But it received attention primarily because of Invisible Children’s ‘KONY2012′ campaign. As I noted previously, virtually every story about Achellam’s “capture” cited KONY2012 and the now world-famous “hunt for Joseph Kony”.

Moreover, in my experience interviewing individuals involved in the northern Ugandan peace process, including government ministers, religious and civil society leaders, as well as delegates from the peace talks, there remains almost little to no concern that the ICC or any form of trial justice risks undermining peace. In short, it really does appear that northern Uganda has moved beyond the “peace versus justice” debate.

To those who study the region, this will come as little surprise. Northern Uganda is currently enjoying the longest period of ‘negative peace’, or what many call a “silence of the guns”, in decades. During and following the Juba Peace Talks (2006-2008) the LRA, and the conflict between the LRA and the Government of Uganda more generally, was exported out of northern Uganda to the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic and Sudan. Sure, the LRA had been operating in these areas long before the Juba negotiations, but no large-scale LRA attacks have occurred in northern Uganda since the talks began. Today, it is not fear of LRA offensives or abductions that dominate public discourse in northern Uganda. Instead, it is critical issues such as nodding disease, low education standards and land grabs.

I find this development particularly interesting as it fits within the context of the history of ‘transitional justice’. Other states too have only sought trial justice after a period of impunity when amnesties were granted to perpetrators. I have previously argued (see here and here) the record suggests that it is only when fear that prosecution will destabilize or undermine a transition to peace dissipates that societies stop opposing prosecutions.

Of course, this does not mean that a policy recommendation for transitional states should be to issue amnesties and then to revoke them when they’re good and ready. In the northern Ugandan case, no amnesties will be revoked; amnesty certificates simply won’t be issued any longer. More importantly, sequencing peace and justice through the use of amnesties may be a fallacy – no combatant or perpetrator would ever trust the use of amnesties that they knew would subsequently expire or be revoked.

None of this is to say that there is no longer any reason to continue granting amnesties. Some continue to believe amnesty remains an integral ingredient in helping to promote peace in northern Ugandan – and they might be right. For example, Michael Poffenberger, of Resolve, recently argued that the Amnesty Act can still play an important role in diminishing the LRA as a rebel force.

Moreover, the expiry of the amnesty was clearly done without much concern for the democratic process. The issue wasn’t discussed in Uganda’s Parliament. Troublingly, local citizens and groups weren’t properly or sufficiently consulted. The opinion in northern Uganda, as assessed by Justice and Reconciliation Project, clearly indicates a majority support for the continuation of the Act.

There remains a desperate need for a comprehensive and cohesive transitional justice strategy in Uganda. Amnesties for low-level LRA rebels outside of northern Uganda should probably be included. But it remains remarkable just how far northern Uganda has come since the days when the “peace versus justice” debate dominated the headlines. It is increasingly unfeasible to argue that unless the Amnesty Act is continued, the very peace that northern Uganda enjoys is itself at risk. In other words, the very boundaries of the amnesty debate have changed. Amnesty or not, the people of northern Uganda will continue on their path towards peace and justice.

Amnesty consultations Barlonyo

Policy brief on amnesty released

Amnesty consultations Barlonyo

JRP is pleased to announce the release of its latest policy brief, Who forgives whom? Northern Uganda’s grassroots views on the Amnesty Act.

After more than twelve years in force, Uganda discontinued blanket amnesty for reporters on 25 May 2012 by allowing Part 2 of the Amnesty Act of 2000 to lapse. The continued relevance of Uganda’s Amnesty Act had been fiercely debated in recent months in high-level discussions between government and civil society, with many asking, “What should be the future of the Amnesty Act?”

Recognizing the absence of grassroots voices in many of these debates, especially from a gendered perspective, JRP carried out a series of consultations from 21-27 March 2012 in conflict-affected regions of northern Uganda — including West Nile, Lango, Acholi and Teso — to discern the views of those most directly impacted by and benefiting from the Act on its role, achievements and continued relevance. The consultations unveiled mixed views at the grassroots level on the past and present relevance and equity of the Act, yet reached overwhelming general consensus for the renewal of the Act with amendments. Following the government’s decision to abolish amnesty, this brief seeks to contribute to the ongoing consultative and policy-making process to integrate elements of conditional amnesty into a national TJ policy.

Please visit http://justiceandreconciliation.com/2012/06/who-forgives-whom-northern-ugandas-grassroots-views-on-the-amnesty-act/ to read the full briefing.

For comments or questions, please write to info@justiceandreconciliation.com.

Amnesty consultations Barlonyo

Who Forgives Whom? Northern Uganda’s Grassroots Views on the Amnesty Act

JRP Amnesty Policy Brief CoverTo read the full briefing, click here.

Overview
After more than twelve years in force, Uganda discontinued ‘blanket’ amnesty for reporters on 25 May 2012 by allowing Part 2 of the Amnesty Act of 2000 to lapse. With positive developments in the creation of a transitional justice (TJ) framework and a shifting of the armed conflict to neighboring countries, the continued relevance of Uganda’s Amnesty Act of 2000 had been fiercely debated in recent months in high-level discussions between government and civil society, with many asking, “What should be the future of the Amnesty Act?”

Recognizing the absence of greater North grassroots voices in many of these debates, especially from a gendered perspective, the Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP) carried out a series of consultations from 21-27 March 2012 in conflict-affected regions of northern Uganda—including West Nile, Lango, Acholi and Teso—to discern the views of those most directly impacted by and benefitting from the Act on its role, achievements and continued relevance. As subsequent sections of this paper reveal, the consultations unveiled mixed views at the grassroots level on the past and present relevance and equity of the Act, yet reached overwhelming general consensus for the renewal of the Act with amendments. Such amendments were seen to better address the justice needs of both victims and perpetrators, while ensuring the sustainability of an already fragile peace.

Draft versions of this brief were circulated prior to the Act’s expiration to inform the Justice, Law and Order Sector’s (JLOS) decision to abolish, renew or renew with amendments Uganda’s Amnesty Act. However, with the JLOS Leadership Committee’s subsequent decision to abolish amnesty, this brief seeks to contribute to the Government of Uganda’s ongoing consultative and policy-making process to integrate elements of conditional amnesty into a national TJ policy.

To read the full briefing, click here.

Published with financial support from UNWOMEN under the Women’s Access to Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict in Uganda Programme.

Disclaimer: The views represented in this brief do not necessarily represent the views of UN Women.

Voices Iss1 2012 cover

Voices Magazine Issue 1, 2012 (Amnesty)

Voices Magazine Issue 1, 2012 (Amnesty)

Click here to view.

Voices Iss1 2012 cover
Cover of the first edition of JRP’s Voices magazine

This is the first issue of the Justice and Reconciliation Project’s (JRP) latest publication, Voices magazine. JRP’s mission is to empower conflict-affected communities to participate in processes of justice, healing and reconciliation, and this magazine aspires to do just that. By providing a regular, open platform for victims and key stakeholders to dialogue on local and national transitional justice developments, we will be “sharing victim-centered views on justice and reconciliation in Uganda” each quarter.

The theme of this first issue is amnesty. With Uganda’s Amnesty Act up for expiration, renewal or renewal with amendments on 24 May, we have sought to present the views of the war-affected communities where we operate. In this issue, key stakeholders like Michael Otim of the International Center for Transitional Justice (pg 13), Ismene Nicole Zarifis, International Technical Advisor on TJ for JLOS (pg 6,) and members of the JRP team address the important question: What should be the future of Uganda’s Amnesty Act? Like all of our work, we hope this collection of views contributes to the policy-making process currently taking place in Kampala, and links the grassroots with the decision-makers.

Click here to view.

Note: If printing on a B&W printer, we recommend you print this grayscaled version.

“Where to With Transitional Justice in Uganda?” Justice in Conflict blog, 22 April 2012

“Where to With Transitional Justice in Uganda? The Situation After the Extension of the Amnesty Act,” Justice in Conflict blog, 22 April 2012
http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/04/22/where-to-with-transitional-justice-in-uganda-the-situation-after-the-extension-of-the-amnesty-act/

By Patrick Wegner

Regular readers of this blog are aware that Uganda has both an amnesty law in force since 2000 as well as an International Crimes Division (ICD) at the High Court which is able to try crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

The 2000 Amnesty Act is broad, essentially granting ‘blanket amnesty’ for all crimes committed during rebellion if the reporter agrees to renounce armed struggle. Despite the Amnesty Act being in force, the Department of the Public Prosecutor (DPP) in Uganda charged a mid-level commander of the LRA, Thomas Kwoyelo, with crimes against humanity under the Geneva Convention. JiC has reported extensively about the trial in the past, you find all the articles here. Despite several court rulings that Kwoyelo has a legal right to receive amnesty and should be set free, the DPP argued that amnesty is not applicable for crimes against humanity. In violation of these court rulings and due process, Kwoyelo remains in jail at Luzira Prison, Kampala.

The Government of Uganda (GoU) has not taken a clear position concerning the Kwoyelo case and the clash between the blanket amnesty and the existence of a Court Division able to try international crimes. Therefore the upcoming review of the Amnesty Act in May 2012 has been anticipated with uncertainty and curiosity by observers. Will the GoU move away from the past amnesty approach and give in to the DPP that had stated it wanted to bring more charges against former LRA rebels? Or would it uphold the amnesty approach followed since 2000?

Now the Deputy Speaker of the Ugandan Parliament, Jacob Oulanyah, announced on Saturday 14th of April in Gulu that the extension of the Amnesty Act for two years is a done deal and that the law just waits being gazetted. (Thanks to Sharon Nakandha from Avocats sans Frontières Uganda for forwarding the article). This has some important implications for the way forward in transitional justice in Uganda.

It is important to acknowledge that the Amnesty Act was passed with strong civil society pressure from northern Uganda. Many northern Acholi see the LRA rebels as their abducted children and want them to lay down arms and return home. According to asurvey conducted by the Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP) in December 2011 98 per-cent of the northern population believe that the amnesty is still relevant and should not be abolished. Abolishing the amnesty would thus go against the wishes of the formerly war affected population in northern Uganda. President Museveni has no reason to alienate his northern constituency (he received a majority in northern Uganda for the first time in the 2011 elections) by attacking a law that many see as very useful.

Former LRA Commander Thomas Kwoyelo in the courtroom (Edward Echwalu/Reuters)

According to recent figures from the JRP survey, 22,520 rebels have taken amnesty so far – 48 per-cent of them LRA members. Abolishing the amnesty law now would not have revoked those amnesties but, in the context of the ongoing detention of Thomas Kwoyelo, it would surely have stirred fears among LRA returnees. In my interviews with LRA officers in northern Uganda their fears of being tried years after they returned from the bush, be it by the ICC or the ICD, was very tangible. The fact that the amnesty was prolonged is also important for the military efforts to combat the LRA in the DRC, Central African Republic and South Sudan as it ensures that the formerly abducted fighters have a way out. The Amnesty Act can thus contribute to weaken the LRA by luring out fighters from the ‘bush’.

Yet, the fact that the Amnesty Act will apparently simply be prolonged without any changes also means that Uganda’s national concept for transitional justice remains incoherent and contradictory. Uganda has a blanket amnesty in place that covers any and all crimes, a notion that is on the retreat in international law. Many would indeed even argue that a blanket amnesty is not acceptable in international law: The Inter-American Court for Human Rights ruled so famously in its Barrios Altos case and the UN has instructed its envoys to not endorse blanket amnesties in peace negotiations. Yet, under Uganda’s Amnesty Act even Joseph Kony himself would have a right to receive amnesty.

At the same time, Uganda created a Division that is capable of trying these crimes but will not be able to do so as long as the amnesty remains in place in its current form. The GoU could have solved this problem and brought the Amnesty Act into line with international standards.

A reception centre for LRA abductees (Centre for Children in Vulnerable Situations)

According to the Amnesty Act the Parliament of Uganda has the power to revoke the amnesty for individuals on request of the Minister of Defence. It would thus be theoretically possible to revoke the amnesty for the LRA Commanders most responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Museveni had threatened several times to exclude the LRA commanders from amnesty only to then publicly ask Kony and his Commanders to accept the amnesty offer of the government. The Ugandan High Court even explicitly ruled in October 2005 that amnesty remains available for the LRA commanders. These inconsistencies may re-emerge in the future as the GoU once again failed to clarify its stance. If Joseph Kony was arrested tomorrow, the GoU would be caught between its constitution and the amnesty law on the one side, and its international legal obligations to surrender Joseph Kony and his key commanders to the ICC on the other side.

It is also strange that the GoU apparently did not wait for a report of the Transitional Justice Working Group of the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) of the Government in which JLOS would have published its results of conducting surveys about the amnesty and traditional justice in all of Uganda. The Transitional Justice Working Group is charged with developing a coherent concept for transitional justice in Uganda, presumably providing for a comprehensive approach including amnesty, traditional justice, a truth commission and trials. The JLOS plans are impressive on the paper and could provide a blueprint for transitional justice concepts in post-conflict areas (see here for details).

Why did the decision makers not wait for this valuable feedback before deciding whether and how to prolong the Amnesty Act? One can only hope that the final suggestions of the Transitional Justice Working Group will be taken more seriously for the sake of a coherent and comprehensive approach towards transitional justice in Uganda.

“Taking ‘Kony 2012′ Down A Notch,” Justice in Conflict blog, 7 March 2012

“Taking ‘Kony 2012′ Down A Notch,” Justice in Conflict blog, 7 March 2012
http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/03/07/taking-kony-2012-down-a-notch/

JRP is cited (below: “majority of Acholi people”) in reference to our December situational analysis on amnesty.

By Mark Kersten

As we speak, one of the most pervasive and successful human rights based viral campaigns in recent memory is underway. Invisible Children’s ‘Kony 2012‘ campaign has taken Twitter, Youtube, Facebook and every other mainstream social media refuge by storm. In many ways, it is quite impressive. But there’s one glaring problem: the campaign reflects neither the realities of northern Ugandan nor the attitudes of its people. In this context, this post examines the explicit and implicit claims made by the ‘Kony 2012′ campaign and tests them against the empirical record on the ground.

Before jumping into the fray, however, I should preface the post by noting that, in many ways, Invisible Children have done a fantastic job in advocating for the rights of northern Ugandans, highlighting the conflict and providing tangible benefits to victims and survivors of LRA brutality. Indeed, this post is not intended to take aim at Invisible Children as an organization but rather to debunk some of the myths its ‘Kony 2012′ campaign is propagating.

The Problem is Popularity? 

Kony 2012 is about making Joseph Kony, the leader of the notorious LRA, famous because, the line of reasoning goes, if everyone knew him, no one would be able to stand idly by as he waged his brutal campaign of terror against the people of East Africa.

I am actually stupefied that any analysis of the ‘LRA question’ results in the identification of the problem being that “Kony isn’t popular enough”. The reality is that few don’t know who Joseph Kony is in East Africa and the Great Lakes Region, making it all-too-apparent that this isn’t about them, their views or their experiences. But even more puzzling is that Joseph Kony is one of the best known alleged war criminals in the world – including in the United States. This is the case in large part because of the advocacy of Western NGOs, including Invisible Children and the Enough Project as well as the ICC arrest warrants issued against Kony and his senior command.

I would understand if this were the 1990s or even the early 2000s when the misery plaguing northern Uganda flew completely under the radar. I would understand if this campaign was about the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. But a campaign in 2012, premised on Joseph Kony not being famous enough is just folly.

'Kony 2012'

A poster from the ‘Kony 2012’ campaign. (Poster: Invisible Children)

Umm…what about northern Ugandans?

It is hard to respect any documentary on northern Uganda where a five year-old white boy features more prominently than any northern Ugandan victim or survivor. Incredibly, with the exception of the adolescent northern Ugandan victim, Jacob, the voices of northern Ugandans go almost completely unheard.

It isn’t hard to imagine why the views of northern Ugandans wouldn’t be considered: they don’t fit with the narrative produced and reproduced in the insulated echo chamber that produced the ‘Kony 2012′ film.

‘Kony 2012′, quite dubiously, avoids stepping into the ‘peace-justice’ question in northern Uganda precisely because it is a world of contesting and plural views, eloquently expressed by the northern Ugandans themselves. Some reports suggest that the majority of Acholi people continue to support the amnesty process whereby LRA combatants – including senior officials – return to the country in exchange for amnesty and entering a process of ‘traditional justice’. Many continue to support the Ugandan Amnesty law because of the reality that it is their own children who constitute the LRA. Once again, this issue is barely touched upon in the film. Yet the LRA poses a stark dilemma to the people of northern Uganda: it is now composed primarily of child soldiers, most of whom were abducted and forced to join the rebel ranks and commit atrocities. Labeling them “victims” or “perpetrators” becomes particularly problematic as they are often both.

Furthermore, the crisis in northern Uganda is not seen by its citizens as one that is the result of the LRA. Yes, you read that right. The conflict in the region is viewed as one wherein both the Government of Uganda and the LRA, as well as their regional supporters (primarily South Sudan and Khartoum, respectively) have perpetrated and benefited from nearly twenty-five years of systemic and structural violence and displacement. This pattern is what Chris Dolan has eloquently and persuasively termed ‘social torture‘ wherein both the Ugandan Government and the LRA’s treatment of the population has resulted in symptoms of collective torture and the blurring of the perpetrator-victim binary.

Kony and Egeland

Kony and his former second in command, Vincent Otti, with former UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland (Photo: New York Times)

The Solution?

Given Invisible Children’s problematic identification of the issue, it becomes impossible for them to come up with an appropriate vision of resolving the crisis.

Invisible Children is, perhaps rightly, proud that it put the ‘LRA question’ on the Obama administration’s agenda. In this context, last year’s announcement that the administration would send 100 military ‘advisors’ to Uganda was widely celebrated. But this triumphalism occludes key realities.

The sending of 100 troops was not, in any sense, an altruistic move by the administration. First, it went unreported that many of the troops were already in Uganda. Second, the announcement was, at least in part, a tit-for-tat response for the Government of Uganda’s military engagement in Somalia – where the US refuses to deploy troops. As Matt Brown of the Enough Project conceded:

“The U.S. doesn’t have to fight al-Qaida-linked Shabab in Somalia, so we help Uganda take care of their domestic security problems, freeing them up to fight a more dangerous – or a more pressing, perhaps – issue in Somalia.

It is clear that the ‘Kony 2012′ campaign sees the 100 US troop allotment as inadequate. Here they are right – 100 US troops is not the solution. But their own answer is highly problematic.

We know what the makers of “Kony 2012″ believe should happen but they won’t say it explicitly, except to say that Kony must be “stopped”.

Obama’s orders for his 100 troops – presumably supported by those behind ‘Kony 2012′ – is to “kill or capture” Joseph Kony. I don’t think it is a stretch to suggest that many of the same individuals who will form the legion of participants in ‘Kony 2012′ were on the streets celebrating the killing of Osama bin Laden. It thus likely holds that they bought into the belief, proffered by Obama himself, that bin Laden’s killing amounted to justice and if you didn’t agree, you should get your head checked.

The solution then, is something similar: an American-led intervention into at least four countries where the LRA is or has been active (Uganda, the DRC, the Central African Republic and South Sudan) to hunt down Kony. Capturing him, after all, is secondary to “stopping” him.

The idea of “stopping Kony”, of course plays into the narrative created by the ‘Kony 2012′ campaign where what actually happens to Kony and the LRA is irrelevant. The unspecific aim of “stopping” him is sufficient. Who, after all, doesn’t want Kony “stopped”? But then what? If Kony is killed or captured, then what? What happens to the other members of the LRA? ‘Kony 2012′ offers no answers here.

In this context, it is worthwhile remembering that massive regional military solutions (Operations Iron Fist and Lightning Thunder most recently), with support from the US, have thus far failed to dismantle or “stop” the LRA. These failures have created serious and legitimate doubts that the ‘LRA question’ is one that can be resolved by military means.

Incredibly, there is no mention in the film or the campaign that northern Ugandans are currently enjoying the longest period of peace since the conflict began in 1986. Virtually every single northern Ugandan I spoke to during my own field research believes that there is peace in the region. While sporadic violence continues, particularly as a result of bitter land disputes, there have been no LRA attacks in years. In the mid 2000s, the ‘LRA problem’ was exported out of Uganda. The LRA is currently residing in the DRC, CAR, and perhaps parts of South Sudan and even Darfur. Today, land issues and the recent Walk to Work crisis are higher on the agenda than the LRA in northern Uganda.

Lastly, killing Kony cannot resolve the actual sources of the crisis which are far more structural than superficial (to put it lightly) analyses like ‘Kony 2012′ would like to admit. As respected scholars of northern Uganda, Mareike Schomerus, Tim Allen, and Koen Vlassenroot, recently argued,

“Until the underlying problem — the region’s poor governance — is adequately dealt with, there will be no sustainable peace.”

Kony (left) with Otti. (Photo: AFP)

The Need for a Sober Second Thought

In the end, ‘Kony 2012′ falls prey to the obfuscating, simplified and wildly erroneous narrative of a legitimate, terror-fighting, innocent partner of the West (the Government of Uganda) seeking to eliminate a band of lunatic, child-thieving, machine-gun wielding mystics (the LRA). The main beneficiary of this narrative is, once again, the Ugandan Government of Yoweri Museveni, whose legitimacy is bolstered and – if the ‘Kony 2012′ campaign is ‘successful’ – will receive more military funding and support from the US.

Of course, as a viral campaign launched through social media, ‘Kony 2012′ is impressive, if not unprecedented. It will, undoubtedly, mobilize and morph a horde of sincere American youths into proxy war criminal hunters. It will further succeed in increasing the ‘popularity’ of Joseph Kony and the LRA in the United States. But it will do so for many of – if not all – the wrong reasons.

I remember when I was in grade school and a teacher told the students that it was actually difficult to fail. “You have to try to fail,” he said. If ‘Kony 2012′ is to be judged by its reflection of the realities on the ground in northern Uganda and how it measures up against the empirical record, the makers of Kony 2012 tried – and succeeded.

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UPDATE: I’ve now published a response to the main criticisms that this post has inspired. See here: Taking ‘Kony2012′ Down a Notch – Responding to Criticism.

Check out this excellent account by Daniel Solomon over at his blog, Securing Rights.

Also, big thanks to my friend and colleague, Paul Kirby, for his insightful comments on a draft of this post.

Justice in north needs complex solutions, Daily Monitor, 29 Jan 2012

Justice in north needs complex solutions, Daily Monitor, 29 Jan 2012
http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/ThoughtIdeas/-/689844/1315470/-/item/0/-/9le52p/-/index.html

By Lino Owor Ogora

In July last year, Thomas Kwoyelo became the first Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) commander to be charged before Uganda’s International Crimes Division (ICD). He was charged with 53 counts crimes against humanity. On September 22, a few months after the commencement of his trial, Uganda’s Constitutional Court ruled that Kwoyelo was entitled to amnesty in line with Uganda’s Amnesty Act of 2000, and ordered his trial to be halted forthwith, a ruling which was further upheld by the High Court on January 25, 2012.

This court ruling has attracted mixed reactions from national and international actors and the public at large. While some people have applauded the court ruling and amnesty alike, others condemned both.

The case of Kwoyelo, however, re-affirms the fact that the pursuit of justice in northern Uganda requires complex solutions beyond merely dragging ex-commanders of the LRA to the courts of law.

In this regard, it is vital to understand the significance of amnesty in stemming the conflict in northern Uganda, and the complications that come with handling individuals who carry dual victim-perpetrator identities.

Uganda’s Amnesty Act of 2000 offers pardon to ‘any Ugandan who has at any time since January 26, 1986, engaged in or is engaging in war or armed rebellion against the government of the Republic of Uganda’. In northern Uganda, amnesty has been instrumental in fostering the return of thousands of ex-combatants. Until August 22, 2008, the Amnesty Commission’s database indicated 22,930 reporters – 50 per cent of these were LRA reporters.

Success in the air
This is an indication that amnesty has registered a tremendous success. If it were not for amnesty, millions of people would still be living within IDP camps. Thousands more children would have been abducted, and even the Juba peace talks which ushered in the prevailing peace in northern Uganda would not have taken place.

Many critics of amnesty may argue that the amnesty law in northern Uganda is no longer relevant given that the LRA have been subdued. However, if you lived in northern Uganda during the period of the insurgency, or even simply visited an IDP camp at the height of the conflict and witnessed the suffering of the people, you would understand and appreciate the prioritisation of ‘peace first, justice later’ and amnesty. It is because of this prioritisation that northern Ugandans, led by religious and traditional leaders were at the forefront of advocating for amnesty as a crucial factor in ending the conflict.

With the LRA still very much alive and committing atrocities in Central African Republic and Southern Sudan, the amnesty law is still needed. In a situational survey conducted by the Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP) in December 2011 in Acholi region, more than 90 per cent of the respondents believed that amnesty was still relevant. Therefore, rather than argue for the total nullification of the amnesty law, perhaps the question we need to answer is whether amendments are required to specify clearly which commanders of the LRA should or should not be granted amnesty in the event that they return.

In addition, the case of Kwoyelo also raises complex questions regarding the perpetrators who are victims themselves. Kwoyelo was abducted at the age of 15 from his village of Pogo in Pabo Sub-County in Amuru District. Like other children and youth before him, he was carried off into captivity, trained into a child soldier and rose through the ranks to become a high ranking commander. The fate of adult commanders of the LRA who were abducted as children and turned into the killers they are today has been a topic of substantial discussion.

Having been abducted while young and vulnerable, Kwoyelo was a victim. Having committed crimes after the age of 18, Kwoyelo should be able to take responsibility for his actions. What then should be the fate of such individuals? Many human rights activists have often flatly insisted that on becoming adults, such individuals need to take full responsibility for their actions. Why is it that such human rights activists never talk of holding the government accountable for failing to protect children such as Kwoyelo from abduction in the first place? There is need to consider all these circumstances when dealing with cases such as Kwoyelo’s.

Furthermore, there is need to reflect on why cases of NRA/UPDF perpetrators who committed war crimes during the insurgency are not coming up. In northern Uganda, it is a known fact that all armed parties to the conflict, including state and non-state actors, committed war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Court martials not good enough?
While the Juba Peace Agreement calls for handling state actors through other measures such as military court martials, many people in northern Uganda feel the outcomes of these courts would be highly unpredictable, and could lead to many state actor perpetrators being let off the hook.

Military court martial proceedings are often closed to the public and conducted by the army leadership and the participation of victims is often limited. For these reasons, many people in northern Uganda will continue reiterating their call for prosecution of state actors within the ICD. If charges are not brought against the UPDF, or at the very least investigations into state violations conducted, then DPP, runs the risk of being labeled partial.

Finally, beyond pursuing justice in courts of law, there is need to keep the needs of victims and survivors of the conflict in mind. Victims need reparations, compensation, restitution, and restoration of their livelihoods.

Beyond passing guilty or non-guilty verdicts, courts of law such as the ICD will not cater for these very important needs. For reparations to be effected in a proper and timely manner, Uganda requires a reparations policy, which is currently lacking. All these factors should be taken into consideration for justice to prevail in Northern Uganda.

The author is a researcher with the Justice & Reconciliation Project, an NGO based in Gulu District.

http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/ThoughtIdeas/-/689844/1315470/-/item/0/-/9le52p/-/index.html